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In this paper I try to contrast the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) with the Financial Instability 
Hypothesis  (FIH) held by Hyman Minsky taking into account the dynamic complexity of financial 
markets and the role of fundamental uncertainty  and organic interdependence. In my opinion this 
approach may provide indeed analytical tools to explain crisis through processes endogenous to 
contemporary economics. The relevance of complex dynamic has been particularly stressed recently by 
Barkley Rosser (2004; 2005); this author consider indeed complex dynamic a strong foundation for 
Keynesian models and results. Complex dynamics enter indeed into the analysis in at least two ways: it 
provides  an independent source of fundamental uncertainty and this one, as discuss by Keynes himself 
(1936, 1937), can lead to speculative bubbles in assets markets and to over-reactions both in lender’s and 
borrower’s attitude toward risk. These aspects can lead to financial fragility and instability and follow a 
variety of complex dynamics. As I shall try to argue a financially complex system, according to the FIH,  
is indeed inherently flawed: in absence of adequate economic policy, booms and busts phenomena in 
financial markets fuelled by credit booms and busts, may generate endogenous instability and systemic 
crisis like the one occurred for the so-called “sub-prime crisis”.  
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“.... our economic leadership does not seem to be aware that the normal functioning of our economy leads to 
financial trauma and crisis, inflation, currency depreciations, unemployment, and poverty in the midst of what 
could be virtually universal affluance- in short, that financially complex capitalism is inherently flawed” 
 






  The severe consequences on the real economy of the current and over-cited “sub-
prime crisis” have reopened the theoretical and empirical debate on the causes and on 
the possible remedies for financial instability and crisis. One of the most puzzling 
aspects of the recent crisis was indeed just how it was unpredicted by the economic 
leadership both academic and inside the international institutions
1.  Recently,  many 
economists that work in the Keynesian tradition (cf. Kregel, 2007; Chick, 2008; Dow, 
2008; Wray, 2008 and 2009; Whalen, 2008; Lawson, 2009) have very frankly 
denounced  the inadequacy of the mainstream models of instability and cycles in 
explaining the origins, nature and effects of current crisis, especially as regards the 
aspects connected with the persistence of the real variables (production, investment, 
employment) and with the phenomena of contagion (which produced chain reactions) 
and propagation both inside the USA and among others developed countries.  
  As well-known, traditional approaches in economics and finance has indeed been 
based on the proposition of the so-called Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) 
developed  at the University of Chicago since ‘70s. According to this theoretical 
approach financial market are efficient, and instability and crisis may happen only as 
temporary shock since markets are always self-regulating and self-stabilizing. As a 
consequence New Classical Macroeconomics (NCM), as leading theoretical approach,  
has put real exogenous shocks at the centre of the analysis of the cycle and of the 
instability of developed capitalist systems. Furthermore standard views in economics, 
up to date, seem to ignore that current capitalistic economies are characterized by 
complex and more and more sophisticated  financial systems driven by the fundamental 
activity of money-managers (cf. Whalen,  2001, 2005; Wray, 2009).  Money-managers 
                                                
1 As well known Queen Elisabeth II recently addressed many embarrassing questions to several 
economists in a speech at London School of Economics concerning the origin and the absence of forecast 
of the current crisis. 3 
move indeed today’s markets and  played a predominant role in the process  that   
created financial fragility and instability at a system level
2. 
 
  In this paper I try to contrast EMH with the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) 
held by Hyman Minsky taking into account the dynamic complexity of financial markets 
and the role of fundamental uncertainty and organic interdependence. In my opinion 
this approach may provide analytical tools to explain crisis through  processes 
endogenous to contemporary economics. The relevance of complex dynamic has been 
particularly stressed by Barkley Rosser (2004; 2005) in several works; this author 
consider indeed complex dynamic a strong foundation for Keynesian models and 
results
3.  
Complex dynamics enter indeed into the analysis in at least two ways. Complex 
dynamics provide an independent source of fundamental uncertainty and this one, as 
discuss by Keynes himself (1936, 1937), can lead to speculative bubbles in assets 
markets and to over-reactions both in lender’s and borrower’s attitude toward risk . 
These aspects, along with organic interdependence can lead to financial fragility and 
instability and follow a variety of complex dynamics (cf. Day and Huang, 1990; Keen, 
1995, 1997, 2009; Vercelli, 2000; Sordi-Vercelli, 2006)
4. 
  As I shall try to argue a financially complex capitalism, according to the FIH,  is 
indeed inherently flawed; that is, in absence of adequate economic policy, booms and 
busts phenomena in financial markets fuelled by credit booms and busts, may generate 
endogenous instability and systemic crisis
5 like the one occurred recently. 
 
The paper is structured thus:  Paragraph (1) overviews and moves critical assessments 
of the EMH; Paragraph (2) is concerned with financial markets as complex dynamic 
                                                
2 The succession of bankruptcies in the  financial  and in the real sectors in the USA and in other 
developed countries has led indeed to the risk of global economic collapse since it constituted a threat to 
the international financial system and to the world economy (cf. Wray, 2008; Krugman, 2009; Roubini, 
2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
3This point is controversial particularly in the Post Keynesian literature. Distinguished scholar Paul 
Davidson (1994, 1996) does not consider the analysis of complexity in capital markets a real enrichment 
to study Keynesian’s results, and contrasts the approach taken by Barkley Rosser on this point. This 
controversy remain, up to date, an open question and is beyond the aim of the present paper. 
4 Barkley Rosser quoted Basil Moore (2005), another distinguished Post Keynesian, since Moore recently 
has pointed out the role of complexity in various forms as intrinsically linked with the process of 
endogenous money formation and uncertainties of economic dynamics. He argues that all this implies the 
need for non-equilibrium and open-system approaches. 
5 See the quotation in epigraph. The association of financial crisis with booms and busts phenomena in 
financial markets, fuelled  by credit booms and crunches, has been a long tradition; authors that represent 
this tradition are not only Minsky (1977; 1982) and Kindleberger (1978) but also Mitchell (1913) and, of 
course, Fisher (1933). 4 
systems; Paragraph (3) shows how complexity and fundamental uncertainty may provide 
the analytical tools to explain current crisis through endogenous processes; Paragraph 





1. Efficient Markets Hypothesis: critical assessments 
 
 
  The central propositions of the EMH had their infancy in the University of Chicago 
(cf. Fama, 1970), that became the leader academic center of mainstream monetary 
macroeconomics and finance for nearly thirty years (cf. Shleifer, 2000).  As well 
known, this theoretical approach have stressed the relevance of different types of 
efficiency  of the financial markets: fundamental-valuation efficiency,  information-
arbitrage efficiency, full-insurance efficiency and functional efficiency. 
According to the principle of fundamental-valuation efficiency investors are perfectly 
rational, from which it follows that market are efficient in the sense that all the usable 
information about fundamentals  is discounted into the current prices. 
  On the other hand if financial markets satisfy the information-arbitrage efficiency, 
thus speculative profits, via technical trading or others means, are not obtainable (i.e. an 
average investor cannot hope to consistently “beat the market”!). In fact, if there are 
some investors that are not rational they trades are random and, being uncorrelated, they 
cancel out each other; even in the presence of correlated  trading strategies, EMH 
stressed that the activity of rational arbitrageurs or market makers may perfectly 
eliminate their irrational influences on prices (Fama, 1965): selling out over-priced and 
buying underpriced securities with respects to fundamentals. It follows that temporary 
or persistent bubbles and crashes cannot occur, other than as adjustments to market 
news (i.e. “the information that might lead to them would indeed be discounted into the 
price instantaneously”!).  
 As  to  full-insurance efficiency financial markets as a whole are efficient  if it is 
possible to insure the delivery of goods and services under a complete set of “state of 
nature” that is, if it is possible to consider an environment à la Arrow-Debreu (A-D). 
Considering  for example the  mortgage contracts, according to EMH these markets are 
efficient if, and only if, the probabilistic risk of the debtors to be unable to meet all 5 
future cash outflows can be known with actuarial  certainty. In this case insurance 
companies (i.e. AIG  in the current crisis) can always provide insurance guaranteeing 
solvency by the debtors, to the investors in these financial assets (cf. Davidson, 2009, p. 
20). 
 Concerning  with  functional efficiency, it is concerned with various activities assured 
by the financial system that is: to mobilize saving; to allow for the diversification and 
sharing of risk; to produce and disseminate  information; to enhance corporate 
governance; to facilitate investments and innovation; and least but non last, to promote 
an orderly financial market for liquid and illiquid assets
6. 
  Following the observations by Whalen (2008, p. 8), one of the starting point of EMH 
(i.e fundamental-valuation efficiency) is that if “even if individual decision makers get 
asset prices or portfolio values wrong, the market as a whole gets them right which 
means that financial instruments are driven by a sort of an invisible hand to some set of 
prices that reflect the underlying or fundamental value of assets: traditional finance 
assumes that when processing data, pratictioners use statistical tools appropriately and 
correctly”. In the classical   EMH, any observed market price variation around the 
actuarial value (i.e. price) determined by fundamentals is ideed presumed to be a 
statistical “white noise”. That is as a group investors  are not predisposed to over-
confidence and to other biases” (cf. Shefrin, 2000, p. 4).   
 The  mainstream approach indeed handle forecasting  assuming  agents  who possess 
perfect rationality and arrive at shared, logical conclusions or expectations about a 
situation they face. When these expectations induce actions that in the aggregate create 
a world that validates them as predictions, they are in equilibrium and are called 
rational expectations: these one are useful in demonstrating logical equilibrium 
outcome and analyzing their consequences. This is because the New Classical 
Macroeconomics (NCM) explains economic fluctuations and cycles  as due only to 
exogenous shocks, describable by a probability function implicitly known by agents with 
rational expectations.  
  But if people are perfect rational, EMH is unable to provides guidelines for how to 
deal with financial crisis both domestically and/or globally. Such crisis are impossible! 
Efficient markets would indeed never permit neither over-borrowing (i.e. households 
and firms to spend an amount that so exceeds their income or cash-flows that the debt 
                                                
6 Concerning with functional efficiency, EMH stress, once again, the existence of a complete  set  of 
markets and the presence of a secondary perfect resale market. 6 
cannot be  serviced) nor over-lending (i.e. by  banks and other financial institutions). 
That is future inter-temporal budget constraints, is assumed perfectly known by the 
decision makers from which it follows  that they act accordingly. If this is the case  
there can never be problems of loans defaults, insolvency, and bankruptcy:  “market 
would not be efficient, if people today enter into contractual transactions they cannot 
fulfil  when the future occurs” (cf. Davidson, 2009, p. 3)
7. That is the future in EMH is 
not radically uncertain but only probabilistically risky.  The presumption that the future 
is known is the foundation of all today’s efficient market theories. This argument was 
become even stronger in the recent decades since a vast risk management and pricing 
system has evolved, combining the best insights of mathematician and financial-
economists with the highly sophisticated computer models. In recent years to evaluate 
and manage the risks, investment bankers in Wall Street based indeed on statistical 
probability the analysis of historical data to predict the future. For example, as stressed 
again by Davidson (2009; p. 20): “the A-D general equilibrium model is the basic 
analytical framework from which most mathematical computer economic models used 
by economists are based. Modern financial efficient market theory suggests that the 
institutional arrangements for market maker specialists to create orderliness are even 
antiquated in this computer age. With computers and the internet, it is implied that the 
meeting of huge numbers of buyers and sellers can be done rapidly and efficiently in 
virtual space”.  
  But from a statistical point of view, if the size of the sample increases, then the 
variance (the quantitative measure of white noise) decreases. Since computers can bring 
together many more buyers and sellers globally than the pre-computer market 
arrangements, the size of the sample of trading participants in the computer age rose 
dramatically. If therefore one believed in EMH, then permitting computer to organize 
the market may reduce significantly the variance and therefore increase the probability 
of a more well organized,  insurable and orderly market than before. During the 
computer era,  financial instability and crisis, once more, may be only the result of 
exogenous shock! 
 
  To move further critical assessments to EMH, one has to restate that Keynes himself 
(1936: ch. 12) and the Keynesian’s analysis of financial markets (cf. Minsky, 1982; 
Tobin, 1984; Davidson, 2009) stressed the speculative attitude and activity of the 
                                                
7 As point out in the next paragraphs EMH do not take into the consideration the possibility of  Minsky’s 
speculative and Ponzi financial units.  7 
investors. In chapter 12
th,  as I’ll emphasize in the next paragraph,  Keynes pointed out 
that speculation is “the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market”; that is the 
aim of the speculator is to “beat the gun”: exactly the opposite stressed by the EMH  
approach ! 
The major puzzle in finance seem to be that mainstream theorists see markets 
differently from the way traders or practitioners do, that is: investors believe that 
technical trading is profitable! Furthermore, as stressed by Keynes (1936, 1937) 
“market psychology ” and “herd effects” unrelated to market news can cause 
endogenously persistent bubbles and crashes. Markets themselves possessing indeed 
“moods”, sometimes describing it as “nervous” or “sluggish” or “jittery”
8. The 
empirical analysis shows that trading volume and price volatility in real financial 
markets are higher than the standard theory predicts All these aspects are in contrast 
with EMH (i.e. both with fundamental-valuation efficiency and with information-
arbitrage efficiency). 
  These are also serious problems that contrast with the hypothesis of  full-insurance 
efficiency, stressed by EMH, despite the fact that financial innovation increases the set 
of financial instruments linked to different “state of nature”.  But, as I’ll point out in the 
next paragraph, the economic system is complex  and the future is characterized by 
radical uncertainty:   “if it is the case, future outcomes cannot  be reliably predicted on 
the basis of existing past and present data, then there is no actuarial basis for insurance 
companies to provide holders of these assets protection against unfavourable outcomes” 
(cf. Davidson, 2009, p. 9). 
 As  to functional efficiency a great problem  is concerned particularly with the 
existence of true orderly financial markets for liquid and illiquid assets, that is markets 
that encourage each holder (investor) of the securities/assets to believe they may have a 
fast exit strategy when they need suddenly decide for it. Indeed, as long as the future is 
uncertain and not just probabilistically risky, the price that liquid and illiquid assets can 
sell for at any future date in a free market could vary dramatically and almost 
instantaneously. That is, in real economic system there are no perfect resale markets for 
any assets and securities.  As I shall try to show in par. 3, this is particularly relevant to 
understand what has happened for example to the prices of real estates  and to mortgage 
backed securities and especially to sub-prime mortgage derivatives in USA. 
  
                                                
8 On this point see Shiller’s (2000) “irrational exuberance” and the acute observations by Arthur (1995). 8 
 
2. Financial markets as complex and inherently flawed systems  
 
  As argued in the previous paragraph EMH is founded on A-D-type analytical context 
in which the hypothesis of complete markets,  perfect information (that is given and 
common to all the players) and the idea that risk can be always perfectly shared or 
insured, seem at most applicable to an ideal world rather than to real economy. In this 
sense EMH  is based on a simplistic approach since it assumes or seems to ignore the 
actual processes that unfold within and beyond economic and financial complex systems 
(cf. Rosser, 1999; 2001; Foster, 2005).  
  Behind an economy that consists of real and tangible aspects such as technologies, 
markets, financial institutions and firms  there are indeed beliefs
9 (cf. Arthur, 1995, p. 
12) that are founded on conventions. The latter influence and guide the  behaviour and 
the actions of the economic agents shaping, in aggregate, the macro economy. That is, 
in contrast with EMH (cf. Lucas, 1978) that largely ignored the people’s behaviour, in 
preference  to the observation of prices, “the way agents think about the environment, 
how they learn and process information ect..”  does matter for economic decisions. 
 These  beliefs  form indeed an ocean of both mutual competing and mutually 
reinforcing entities and only “by accident” they get into a simple homogenous 
equilibrium set. More often they produce complex, ever changing patterns. Interacting, 
non equilibrium beliefs are unavoidable and since they govern economic behaviour they 
may give rise to instability and crisis in the  financial markets
10.  
As pointed out recently by Marchionatti (2009; p. 2), Keynes was very well aware of 
these aspects since his work as an economist “was essentially an attempt to cope with 
the  complexity  of economic world and with the organic interdependence of the 
variables, founded on a conception of economics as science of social complexity”
11. As 
emphasized by this author, the most important loci of economic complexity in the 
General Theory are the analysis of the long-term expectations and that of the business 
cycle (cf. Marchionatti, 2009; p. 21-24).  Concerning with conventions Keynes stressed 
                                                
9 With similar arguments Shleifer (2000) considered investors sentiment as a cornerstone in the study of 
the behavior of financial markets. 
10 Some (cf. Rosser, 2005) have argued that “complexity implies a new philosophical perspective on how 
humanity relates to nature and to the world indeed on how each individual does so, replacing formal 
deduction with inductive methods as analysts seek to understand an ever-changing and evolving complex 
reality. 
11 On this point see also Carabelli (1988), Rosser (1999). 9 
the relevance of them for economic behaviour particularly in his 1937 article on the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics.   
When Keynes wrote the General Theory the leading actors were the stock market 
investors
12 and investment depends on “the average expectation of those who deal on 
the Stock Exchange as revealed in the price of shares”(p. 151). Investors found their 
actions and decisions from conventions. The essence of conventions lies “in assuming 
that the existent state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have 
specific reasons to expect a change” (cf. p. 158)
13 and: “knowing that our own 
individual judgement is worthless, we endeavour to fall back on the judgement of the 
rest of the world which is perhaps better informed. The psychology of a society of 
individuals each of whom is endeavouring to copy the others leads to what we may 
strictly term a conventional judgement” (cf. 1937, p. 115). 
As stressed again by Marchionatti (cf. 2009), in financial markets the evaluations of the 
investment opportunities depend on the “judgement of the rest of the world” or on the 
attempt “to conform with the behaviour of the majority or the average” (Keynes, 1937, 
p. 114).  Instead economic activity is fundamentally guided by conventional judgement.  
Very often both entrepreneurs and stock market investors must draw from motives 
which are “not rational in the sense of being concerned with the evaluation of the 
consequences” but rather “decided by habit, instinct, preference, desire, will, ect... 
(Keynes, 1938, p. 249). These factors determine people’s state of confidence and 
therefore the magnitude of investment. Both conventional judgements and animal spirits 
make up a fundamental determinant of the state of confidence.  
 
  Furthermore, Keynes consider the meaning  of the state of confidence as twofold: 
 
“So far we have had chiefly in mind the state of confidence of the speculator or speculative investor 
himself and may have seemed to be tacitly assuming that, if he himself is satisfied with the prospects, he 
has unlimited command over money at the market rate of interest. This is not of course the case. Thus we 
must also take account of the other facet of the state of confidence, namely, the confidence of the lending 
                                                
12 In par. 3,  I’ll argue that these leader actors have change during the latest stage of capitalism since an 
increasing role was assumed by money-managers. 
13 Furthermore, quoting Keynes’s 1937 article he argued: “We assume that the present is much more 
serviceable guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been 
hitherto. In other words we largely ignore the prospects of future changes about the actual character of 
which we know nothing” and “We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices and the 
character of existing output is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can accept it 
as such unless and until something new and relevant comes into the picture”. 
 10 
institutions towards those who seek to borrow from them, sometimes described as the state of credit. A 
collapse in the prices of equities, which has led disastrous reactions on the marginal efficiency of capital, 
may have been due to the weakening either of speculative confidence o r  o f  t h e  state of credit. But 
whereas the weakening of either is enough to cause a collapse, recovery requires the revival of both. For 
whilst the weakening of credit is sufficient to bring about a collapse, its strengthening, though a necessary 
condition of recovery, is not a sufficient condition.” (1936, p.158) 
 
  The fluctuations of the state of confidence is what make the business cycle a “highly 
complex” phenomenon (cf. Marchionatti, 2009, p. 25).  Expectations and investment 
cannot indeed be modelled by using probabilistic relationships, the study of instability 
and crisis are therefore beyond the domain of probabilistic inference as assumed by 
EMH. Put in more plain English, under conditions of fundamental uncertainty the 
behaviour of economic agents is so complex that a formal probabilistic treatment of 
expectations is not feasible.  
 In  complex economic systems the predictability that is so successful for hard sciences 
does not work, and theories claiming predictability  and  computability  have misled 
policy makers and continue to do so ( cf. quotation of Taylor- Shipley in Davidson, 
2009 p. 11). For crucial decisions that involved potential large spending outflows or 
possible large income inflows that span a significant length of time (as I have pointed 
out following the observations by Davidson and by other post-keynesian) uncertainty is 
radical. 
  There are indeed serious epistemological problem associated with complex economic 
systems which imply that there exist serious bounds on the rationality
14 (cf. Dequech, 
2001; Rosser, 2001; Marchionatti, 1999) of economic agents assumed by EMH models. 
These bounds take many forms, inability to understand the internal relations of a 
system, inability to fully know crucial parameter values, inability to identify critical 
thresholds or bifurcation points, inability to understand the interactions of agents, 
especially when these agents are thinking about how each other are thinking about each 
others’ thinking
15.  
  This can lead, in turn, to group dynamics as analyzed by Keynes for the well-known 
“beauty contest”  where each party tries to guess the average state of expectations of 
                                                
14 As well-known, the notion of bounded rationality is associated with the analysis by Simon (1987) 
which argued that “human behavior is intendendly rational, but only limitedly so”. Following Dequech 
(2001, p. 913) with “bounded rationality” one denotes the type of rationality that people resort to when 
the environment in which they operate is too complex relative to their limited mental abilities; he tried 
indeed to establish a relation between bounded rationality and fundamental uncertainty via complexity. 
15 Infinitive regress problems imply non-decidability and non-computability for hyper-rational agents (cf. 
Rosser, 2004, p. 18 and Koppl-Rosser, 2002) 11 
the other parties;  i.e. participants in financial markets tend to be more interested at the 
average level of “sentiment” in the market than in the relation of prices to the 
“fundamentals”.  
 
  Quoting Keynes (1936, p. 156):   
 
“... professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors 
have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the 
competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a 
whole: so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself find prettiest, but those 
which he  thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the 
problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s 
judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. 
We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion 
expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher 
degrees". 
 
  Whenever forming expectations means predicting an aggregate outcome that is 
formed in part from others’ expectations, expectations formation can become self-
referential.
16  
The problem of logically forming expectations that becomes ill-defined, and rational 
deduction finds itself with no bottom ground to stand upon: i.e the so-called infinite 
regress problem (cf. Arthur, 1995, p. 8) in decision  making.  The latter can imply 
indeterminacy  of expectations formation and non-computability (cf. Koppl-Rosser, 
2002). The indeterminacy of expectation-formation is by no means a rarity or anomaly 
within  the real economy. On the contrary, it pervades all of economics and, as pointed 
out above using Keynes’s “beauty contest”,  particularly  the financial markets. This is 
the reason why one has to shift the ‘paradigm’
17 suggested by EMH and consider the 
dynamic complexity of the financial markets (cf. Arthur, 1995; Rosser, 2005). 
  The “most obvious implication of the study of complexity in its various forms is 
indeed that a general assumption of rational expectations is very unlikely to hold: “ 
complexity theory has shifted the perspective of many economists towards thinking that 
what was viewed as anomalous or unusual may actually be the usual and expected, 
especially in the realm of asset market where the unusual  seems increasingly 
                                                
16  Self-referential rationality or cognitive rationality has indeed been emphasized particularly by 
behavioural finance (Shleifer, 2000) 
17 On this point see Fontana (2008) and Colander and al. (2009). 12 
commonplace”! (cr. Arthur, 1995, p. 12). The indeterminacy of expectations formation 
may be avoided by making a decision only on “intuitive grounds” that is relying 
ultimately on “conventions”, “herding” and “animal spirits”. 
  When different people have different views about each other’s expectations the 
results can indeed be dynamically complex. This is the problem of heterogeneous 
expectations identified with the “narrow tent complexity” view (cf. Rosser, 2005 p. 9). 
As pointed out by Allen et al. (2003) for the stock markets, in the case of heterogeneous 
agents the consideration  of average expectation that followed causes the failure of  the 
law of iterated expectations about payoffs and agents over-weight the relevance of 
public information with respect to the private one, in forming their guesses
18. 
  The fact that the result of one’s decision depends on the decisions taken by the others 
gives rise to a special character to interdependence . Nevertheless, interdependence in 
itself is  not a source of fundamental uncertainty, since it may merely generate 
complexity in a constant, or predictability changing environment with sufficiently 
capable people. One have to consider organic interdependence, where the whole may be 
more than the sum of its parts. Organic interdependence create fundamental uncertainty 
in the sense that expectations must be about other people’s expectations and this spreads 
fundamental uncertainty (cf. Dequech, 2001, p. 919).  
  Following this approach, and in contrast to EMH,  financial markets are indeed 
complex dynamic systems. In compliance with the analysis moved by Day (1994) and 
by Rosser (1999) a system is dynamically complex if due to endogenous reasons it fails 
to converge to a point, a limit cycle, or a smooth explosion or implosion. The reality of 
complex dynamics undermines the classical view on two grounds (cf. Rosser, 2005, p. 
6):  “first, the presence of complex endogenous dynamics means that the economy is not 
necessary  self-stabilizing or optimal  and  efficient;  second,  that such dynamics 
undermine the assumptions of rational expectations”. 
Even if no single definition is adeguate, in compliance with Foster (2005; p. 877) one 
can discern different order of complexity
19. Forth-order complex systems (the so-called 
interactive knowledge case) is particular important to study financial markets’ 
behaviour: “....Such systems come into being when mental models interact with each 
                                                
18 Indeed, If one agent is asked to guess the average expectation of one asset’s pay-off, since he knows 
that others  have also observed the same public information about the asset, public information become a 
better signal of the average opinion than the private information.  
19 Foster (2005, p.) classifies 4 different types of  complex systems: first order or the imposed energy 
case; second order or the imposed knowledge case; third order or the acquired knowledge case; forth 
order or the interactive knowledge case. For an exhaustive analysis and surveys of economics of 
complexity see Fontana (2008). 13 
other. My imagination can still mould reality, but knowledge that this is so leads others 
to imagine what my imaginings might be”.  
As I shall try to show in what follow, complex dynamics can lead to fundamental 
uncertainty and to speculative dynamics that imply financial fragility and the possibility 
of  financial crisis. Several authors has pointed out that a source of uncertainty  in 
financial markets is indeed linked to the inability to know what other people are 
thinking (cf. Carabelli, 1988; Davis, 1993; Arestis, 1996; Koppl and Rosser, 2002; 
Rosser, 2001).  
  This kind of complex system becomes prevalent when people form aspirations and 
commitments into the future and enter into forward contracts and other arrangements 
with terminal dates in the future. In financial markets agents are not identical and do not 
act according to the rationality  assumed by EMH theorists, but they decide in 
compliance with Keynes’s “beauty contest” where beliefs are driven by the state of 
confidence and conventions.  
But in this case,  their activity can began a bull market
20  in the securities market 
(expecting from others buying and then, resell its assets when the trend is reaching its 
top level) fuelled by an over-lending and over-borrowing process in the credit market
21.  
In this case, efficiency is not reached because not only capital is not allocated according 
to results of the entity, but also this strategy lead to financial bubbles followed by a 
market crashes (when other holders realise that their assets value is starting to decrease) 
a credit crunch and the risk of severe downturns like the ones occurred recently. 
  That is, such financial complex systems present many threats. In fact, when aggregate 
beliefs cease to bear a relationship to realistic possibilities in the presence of positive 
feedback (Arthur, 1990) or positive information spillover (i.e. a given trader is made 
                                                
20 That is expectations formation may be instable. At this respect, for example, Day and Huang (1990) 
labelled herding-agents as “sheep”, when these one dominate, their model shows destabilizing effects 
since market oscillates between chaotically rising bull markets and chaotically declining bear markets. 
On this point see also Farmer et al. (2002). 
21 During a boom, over-indebtedness is linked to the magnitude of both lender’s and borrower’s attitude 
toward risk: “two types of risk affect the volume of investment which have not commonly been 
distinguished but which is important to distinguish. The first is the entrepreneur’s or borrower’s risk and 
arises out of doubts in his own mind as to the probability of his actually earning the prospective yield for 
which he hopes. If a man is venturing his own money, this is the only risk which is relevant. But where a 
system of borrowing and lending exists, by which I mean the granting of loans with margin of real or 
personal security, a second type of risk is relevant which we may call the lender’s risk. This may be due 
either to moral hazard, i.e. voluntary default or other mean of escape, possibly lawful, from the fulfilment 
of the obligation, or to the possible insufficiency of margin of security, i.e. involuntary default due to the 
disappointment of expectation.”....”during a boom the popular estimation of the magnitude of both these 
risks, both borrower’s risk and  lender’s risk, is apt to become unusually and imprudently low”( See 
Keynes GT: p. 144-145). During a burst and a crash the effects are the opposite of the ones described 
above. 14 
better off if everybody else is trading on his information) severe structural discontinuity 
can be the result
22. This is in sharp contrast with most information-based asset pricing 
models: in these models the information spillover is indeed negative (i.e. a given trader 
is made better off if nobody else is trading on his information). 
  But these “bull” and “bear” markets  as well as booms and busts may characterize 
not only the stock market, the exchange-rate market, the price of gold and other non-
reproducible goods, but particularly the long-term bonds market, the markets for futures 
on commodities and, least but nor last, the market for real-estate! (Cf. Tobin, 1984). 
 In  complex financial markets, the participants does analyse more the reaction of the 
market they have in front than the fundamentals (this is in contrast with information 
efficiency stressed by EMH). If everybody has henceforth the same way of thinking (i.e. 
herd behaviour ; cf. Keynes, 1937)
23 this may promote indeed both a boom  of the price 
on the rise, as well a bust  in the decline. During an ascending trend, every operator 
knows pertinently that the price may deviate from fundamental value, and he knows that 
the others also know it, but everybody has anticipated that the upward trend was going 
on. This is, as already stressed, a convention (cf. Keynes, 1937)!  
The convention  notion refers to a dynamic phenomenon. It is about a code which has 
been gradually established in the market and which, unless being questioned by new 
information reaching a certain degree of importance, is called to last. Even the sceptic 
operators get caught up the purchase, considering indeed that it would be pity that they 
do not take advantage of a surplus value  during the resale of the assets.  
With dynamic complexity and fundamental uncertainty he does not buy the bond or 
other asset only because the intrinsic value is good, nor only because he thinks that the 
market things it is, but because everyone thinks that the market thinks that the tendency 
is going to continue. The purchase is rational given the convention which prevails at 
this moment. During a crash, the pattern is even simpler, the tacit agreement has been 
broken so that every operators begin to sell. Now, even when the assets becomes widely 
devalued compared with its intrinsic value, each operator, although realizing this fact, 
still forced to liquidate to not take the risk of having a worthless asset in his hands at the 
end.  
                                                
22 Positive information spillovers are evident in Keynes’s beauty contest: the judges would be better off if 
they could coordinate their choices, even if they coordinate on somebody who is less than beautiful. 
Likewise, short-horizon traders would be better off if they could coordinate their research efforts on the 
same piece of information, even if that information is less revealing about the asset’s long-run value. This 
justify the relevance of short-termism in financial decisions making. 
23 On herding behavior see: Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). 15 
 The  break of the convention engenders a sum of behaviours called self-referential, 
symbolized by mimicry the panic not leaving any alternative. But it is also possible to 
wonder if it is not about a new convention which wants that, when certain threshold is 
reached in the decline, everyone settles his position. Each one knows that each one 
knows that is necessary to withdraw or to sell, and since no-one wants to wait for 
confirmation because the consequences to wait and see  can be very dangerous.  
Self-referential  refers to the history. In fact, if each participant thinks that the uptrend, 
or the decline, is going to continue, because it has always been like that, and as 
everybody remembers. The collective consciousness, acquired by memorisation, even if 
tacit of past events, is omnipresent. Financial markets know also this tendency of 
repetition, which is maybe not rationalized by everyone, but every operator knows that 
large-scale movements stop late and brutally. Each one knows that the tacit agreement  
in the increase are rather long-lasting to have the time to buy and to resell more 
expensively before the crash (no orderly exit strategy as in EMH! ). And if he has not 
had the time for resell, he perfectly knows how ends a fall of prices after the break of 
the convention. So the self-referentiality does not lead either to the efficiency of markets 
since such an automatic coordination leads inevitably to financial fragility and to crisis. 
 
 
3. The  “normal” evolution of complex financial systems towards 
 fragility   
 
 
  In the previous paragraph I tried to show how a complex financial system is 
inherently flawed. As emphasized, this view is in contrast with the EMH and in 
compliance with FIH.  Financial instability is indeed considered endogenous to the 
system: i.e. booms and busts are the result of the internal dynamics of the financial 
markets.  In this paragraph I try to compound  this theoretical approach trying to explain 
several aspects of the current sub-prime crisis.
24  
To understand recent financial turmoil, one has before to outline that one
25 of the most 
important aspect of the USA economy
26 in ‘80s and ‘90s was the increasing role of 
                                                
24 Even if a complete analysis of 2008 crisis is, of course, beyond the aim of this paper. 
25 Another important aspect is connected with the great moderation period as a “radical suspension of 
disbeliefs” that is the idea that the world was more stable and less vulnerable to instability and crisis. 16 
institutional investors-money managers. That is, financial markets in USA were indeed 
not driven primarily by masses of individual investors or even by a few huge 
professional stock-market investors (as stressed by Keynes in the GT; cf. par. 2) or by 
investment bankers, the leaders being  money-managers (MM)
27!; corporate executives 
could not operate with the autonomy that they had in the early days after 2
nd  World 
War, since MM put intensive pressure on the former to drive up the short-term stock 
market valuation of their firms (cf. Wray, 2008).  As well known, money managed 
funds includes not only pension  and  mutual funds, but also venture capital funds, 
private equity funds, and of course hedge funds
28. 
  The consolidation of market power in the hand of MM has been driven by a huge 
process of financial liberalization,  deregulation and reduce supervision  t h a t  h a s  
characterized the financial economic policy in USA for near thirty years. These policies 
had special relevance for two important aspects that characterized structural changes in 
the financial system:  securitization and globalization. Securitization involved pooling 
illiquid assets (mortgages, car loans, student loans) and issuing securities representing 
an interest in the pool. On the other hand, financial globalization was link  with the 
process of internationalization in both the funds and in the assets of the funds that has 
characterized the last stage of capitalism. 
 Furthermore,  financial  market  innovations, by the early ‘80s, take many business 
away from banks (cf. Chick, 2008). Allowing for diversification of risk, these 
innovations, in the form of issued securities collateralized by pooled loans- eliminate 
the advantage banks had previously held. Trough these new instruments institutional 
investors-money managers continually eroded the bank share of assets and liabilities, 
since pension, insurance and hedge funds provided new and alternative source of funds 
and force banks to become more “market oriented” (cf. Wray, 2008, 2009). At the same 
time lenders “become more and more creative and enticed new and increasingly less 
creditworthy homebuyers into the market with exotic mortgages such as “interest only” 
loans and “option adjustable rate” mortgages”. (cf. Whalen, 2008, p. 12). 
                                                                                                                                                                 
26 In  this paragraph I stress the evolution of the financial system in USA, but the importance of money-
managers characterized all the so-called Anglo-Saxon or market-based models of financial capitalism. 
27 In his analysis of capitalist development Minsky labeled this era as Money Manager Capitalism (cf. 
Whalen, 2008) 
28 It is important to point out that these institutional investors, likewise banks, are fundamental and 
essential factors for the financing of investments and economic growth, that is  for a well functioning of a 
modern capitalist system. Nevertheless, as I shall try to show taking into account the complexity of 
financial markets and in absence of strong regulation and supervision, they may produce and magnify 
instability as in the current crisis. 17 
These structural changes in the system generate a systemic problem that results from 
the incorrect notions of EMH  approach (cf. Par. 1)  which  stresses functional efficiency 
(cf. par.1), that is financial markets can properly assess risk,  hedge and shift risk to 
those best able to bear it, and will always discipline decision making
29. Furthermore 
increasing competition encouraged ever-riskier activities forced fund managers to take 
on excessive risk given returns, to rely on ratings agencies. Since similar models were 
widely used, the model themselves drive  financial sophisticated and complex markets – 
generating  herding  both inside the USA and outside
30. As argued in the previous 
paragraph  mimic behaviours were founded on complex dynamics and fundamental 
uncertainty.  
This environment may explain indeed, in my opinion, both the over-lending (by 
institutional investors, banks and other financial institutions) and over-borrowing (by 
households and firms) processes in the credit market and the boom phase in the value of 
real estate and in  the stock market that drive the evolution towards  the fragility of the 
financial system and then to crisis.  
As to the over-lending process, even though from the microeconomic perspective no 
financial institution alone is sufficient  to generate a lending boom, this may came about 
as a consequence of the action by lenders who, in a context of complex dynamics and 
fundamental uncertainty “hunt in herds”. In other words, financial institutions adapted 
their behaviour regarding the granting of loans  to that of the others  because in this way 
they had less to lose in terms of their reputation (cf. Keynes, 1936, 1937; Azariadis, 
1981; Honohan, 1997).  
Herding is also concerned with MM’s behaviour and to the boom phase in the stock 
market and in the prices of real estates. Taking a conservative or contrarian position as 
a bubble builds up should resulted indeed in performance unfavourable to peers and this 
might have affected the MM’s own  employment and compensation. 
As stressed mimicry (cf. par. 2) happens every time the operators act by conventions and 
by observing the behaviour of the others. Given that people’s decisions are influenced 
by their beliefs and that decisions constitute “signals” for others, the improvement (or 
deterioration) in the “state of confidence” can spread with more or less speed to the 
whole system.  
                                                
29 For further critical assessments of these arguments see Stiglitz, (1985). 
30 UK was the country that has the first symptoms of contagion (cf. par. 4) since its financial system’s 
reforms were very similar with the ones adopted in USA. 18 
  In a situation of financial constraints
31, over-indebtedness may arise, which is fuelled 
by the excess availability of supply of funds. In practice, a right-ward shift in the supply 
of funds causes a shift in demand in the same direction (i.e. households and firms have 
indeed a passive role in the process)  and this may explain why the economy moves 
progressively towards a boom. An improvement in the “state of credit” induced by herd 
behaviour  increases indeed the value of capital goods and real assets  but this, in turn, 
has positive effect on the credit constraints
32 with pro-cyclical effects. 
As well known, in USA the processes described above produced a boom phase, not only 
in the real economy (production, investment and employment) but  particularly  in the 
housing prices and in the real estate sectors.  This boom began around the year 2000, 
after the “dot.com” bubble burst; real estate seemed the only safe bet to many 
Americans, especially since interest rates were unusually low.  
When the aforementioned elements (which are not meant to be a comprehensive list of 
factors contributing to recent financial-market events) are mixed together the tendency 
was toward an increasing in the so-called “Ponzi financial units”
33 and then to an 
increasing of the overall financial fragility:  i.e by lending institutions, by households 
and by purchasers of mortgage-backed securities. 
 
 
4. From the credit crunch to the international financial crisis 
 
 
   The process of over-indebtedness  described in the previous paragraph, essentially 
hinges on the complexity  of the financial system. Since banks and other institution’s 
financial structure became particularly fragile, the risk of a credit crunch and of 
systemic financial crisis increased.  
The weight of this growing risk resulted in a rise in the cost of credit in the post-boom 
phases. In fact, banks and institutional money funds intensified their monitoring 
                                                
31 On this point see Fazzari-Papadimitriou (1992) and Stiglitz (1985). 
32 The following  statement by George Soros is significant in this respect (cf. Kregel, 1998, p.2): “ the 
very act of lending may change expectations and thus the value of the collateral used to secure the loan. 
This suggests a positive relation between the value of the collateral and the value of the loan it secures, 
lending may strengthen the firm and thus the bank” and again Kiyotaki-Moore (1997, p. 212): “durable 
assets such as land, buildings and machinery play a dual role: not only are a factor of production, but they 
serve as collateral for loans. Borrowers’ credit limits are affected by the prices of collateralized assets. 
And in the same time, these prices are affected by the size of the credit limits”.  
33 As labeled by Minsky (1982). 19 
activities with a consequent increase in the agency costs or of the collateral required 
because of the increase in the lender’s risk. More particularly, this happened as soon 
as the payment obligations  increased at a higher rate than the expected future cash-
flow;  financial institutions will be driven to hold that the new financial structure had 
worsened too much (in other words, they deem the increase in leverage excessive) and 
then pushed for a reversal in tendency. Furthermore, to the extent that the contracts 
made in the past were financed with short term loans, the evolution of the financing 
costs will have a negative impact on the value of these latest contracts when the time 
comes to refinance them. The worsening of the “state of credit” lead to a drop in 
employment and in the production financed with loans. 
  Moreover, on account of the information asymmetry, the interest rate rise will 
worsen the “quality” (adverse selection) of the patrimonial assets of the banks which, 
once the rate considered optimal is exceeded, may decide to ration the credit (cf. 
Whalen, 2008):  this drove investment, income and employment down even further. 
At this point as the credit available to the private sectors was rationed or the conditions 
on which they can get access to credit became more onerous
34, households and firms 
were  forced  to liquidate their financial assets, or even sold their real estates in order to 
meet their obligations. Alternatively, they could attenuate the problems by offering their 
creditors further collateral (guarantees). However during the credit crunch the sale of  
capital goods and real assets  triggered a collapse in the price of these assets
35 and so 
not only provoked a drop in the patrimonial value of collateral itself but, through the 
effect on the general price levels, caused a further drop in the internal net worth of 
households and firms in real terms
36. 
 The  credit crunch also negatively influenced the stock market, the price of demand 
and the price of supply of capital goods (i.e.  real estate) and therefore reduce the 
aggregate consumption and the aggregate investment, further aggravating the drop in 
income and employment. A deterioration in the “state of credit” therefore reduced the 
levels of income and employment not only directly, but also indirectly because of the 
process of deflation on the prices of assets which may be set off with effects on the real 
variables that, as we have seen, was the opposite of those which characterized the boom. 
                                                
34 In such a case the firms and households are said to be in financial distress. 
35 In contrast with EMH there are not any perfect resale markets for these kind of assets.  
36 Such a situation increased the risk of debt-deflation process (cf. Fisher, 1933; Roubini, 2007; Krugman, 
2008). The fall in the value of capital goods may occur both because there is no market for them
36 (i.e. no 
orderly financial markets as in EMH case) and therefore the value that is realized is generally much lower 
than the effective one, and because if the desire for liquidity grows, the discount rate with which the 
entrepreneurs discount the future cash-flow which derives from the investment increases.  20 
  The first bank failure (i.e Lehman Brothers on September 15
th 2008) caused the 
foreign investors to lose confidence and raised the possibility of bank panic
37. In the 
USA case, for example, the first bankruptcies by financial institutions were actually 
interpreted as a sign that the entire financial system was  in danger, and so many 
believed
38 that it was time to ask for the loans to be repaid, thereby triggering a self-
fulfilling systemic crisis.  
The latter  further aggravated the negative impact on the real variables. Indeed, the drop 
in the lenders’ level of confidence and the presence of asymmetric information among 
foreign investors (especially banks) and american banks and financial institutions, set 
off a withdrawal of capital even in respect of the ones which were still sound from a 
point of view of the balance sheet. This caused a big drop in loans and, through the 
multiplier, of deposits, thus driving other banks to insolvency and then to bankruptcy.  
  In compliance with FIH in a complex financial system one is not to be surprised by 
observing the huge wave of defaults by homeowners, highly leveraged mortgage-
backed lenders, and holders of mortgage backed securities. This was partly due to panic, 
but it was also partly due to the recognition of the fact that precarious borrowing had 
woven its way into the entire system- indeed into the global financial system- and 
nobody really knew where the greatest dangers were (cf. Wray, 2008). 
According to this analysis panic phenomena originated, once again, in a situation of 
complex dynamics  and  organic interdependence (cf. Par. 2),  make it possible to 
explain the effect of contagion and propagation which occurred in the case of USA. 
The effect was even more disastrous because the prominent role of the inter-bank 
market caused a chain reaction within the area and also among the banks in the other 
countries
39. 
  The bankruptcies of several banks  and financial institutions in USA, meant that 
there was a drastic reduction in funding for those firms which were not able to secure 
credit by turning to the market, instead of financial intermediaries
40. But the absence of 
bank financing led to “equity rationing” for many of them due to the effect of the 
                                                
37 The financial panics result when short-term debts looms large relative to short-term liquidity; some 
trigger investors into calling loans, and the borrower cannot refinance.  
38As I have emphasized in par. 2, herd behaviour plays a key role also during the bust and the crash. 
39 Banks are operators which “produce” information and make it possible to reduce the phenomena of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. If they go bankrupt or their assets collapse due to debt deflation, the 
result is a drop in efficiency in the allocation of the resources between operators with a surplus and of 
funds and those with a deficit of funds, thereby lowering the levels of employment and production and 
may lead to the collapse of economic activity. 
40 According to Bernanke (1983), this effect seems to have been one of the factors which explains the 
persistence in the fall of the real variables during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 21 
negative signal
41 or the possibility of securing direct sources of financing only on 
onerous terms: the information spillovers (within individual countries) can therefore 
provide a plausible explanation of why the effects of the bank crisis were so devastating 
on the stock market inside USA. 
 The  information spillovers also had a strong impact on other countries, having led to 
the possibility that phenomena of financial instability present in USA could be 
transmitted to others, with the same institutional characteristics as regards the financial 
system and by means of a change in the global state of confidence.  
The emphasis on the failure of the banks and of the financial institutions and the process 
of disintermediation was therefore particularly important because it was linked to the 
phenomenon which led to information destruction and then to the coordination failure. 
The latter would inexorably led, in absence of international lender’s of last resort 
activity  and big deficit spending policies, to the risk of the collapse of the entire 








     In this paper I have tried  to contrast the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) with 
the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) held by Hyman Minsky, taking into account 
the dynamic complexity of financial markets and the role of fundamental uncertainty 
and organic interdependence: this approach may provide indeed analytical tools to 
explain crisis through processes endogenous to contemporary economics.  
     The leading theoretical approach in finance (i.e. EMH) and in macroeconomics (i.e. 
NCM) were, up to date, unable both to anticipate and to explain the causes and the 
effects of such a phenomenon. In order to gain a more thorough understanding of what 
happened in the current financial crisis it is necessary indeed to re-elaborate a new 
approach which includes the role of  complexity in  the financial system.  
      Complex dynamics can  fuel a speculative bubbles in assets markets and propel 
over-reactions both in lender’s and borrower’s attitude toward risk. These aspects can 
                                                
41 In a phase of deflation the direct issue of shares is in fact perceived as a sign that the firm has not been 
able to obtain credit (see James, 1987).  22 
lead, in turn, to financial fragility and instability  and follow a variety of complex 
dynamics.  
      Taking  into  account  these  observations  and  the  structural financial development 
occurred since ’80,  I have showed how the internal dynamic of the financial system 
through the actions of money managers, bankers and financial institutions, can lead to a 
process of overall over-indebtedness
42 and increase the risk of systemic financial crisis. 
As for FIH approach a complex financial system is indeed inherently flawed: in absence 
of adequate economic policy, booms and busts phenomena in financial markets fuelled 
by credit booms and busts, may generate endogenous instability and systemic crisis like 
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